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TO TOUCH AND CONCERN THE UNITED
STATES WITH SUFFICIENT FORCE:
HOW AMERICAN DUE PROCESS AND CHOICE
OF LAW CASES INFORM THE REACH OF THE
ALIEN TORT STATUTE AFTER KIOBEL
Karima Tawfik*
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INTRODUCTION
In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Nigerian nationals residing in
the United States sued Dutch, British, and Nigerian corporations in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York under
the Alien Tort Statute1 (ATS), alleging that the corporations aided and
* J.D., Dec. 2015, The University of Michigan Law School. I would like to thank the
international and comparative law faculty and program at The University of Michigan Law
School for their support.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States.”).
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abetted the Nigerian government in violently suppressing demonstrators
who were protesting the environmental effects of oil exploration.2 In Ki-
obel, all nine Justices agreed on the narrow holding that in the case of a
foreign defendant, foreign plaintiff, and where all relevant conduct took
place outside the United States, the ATS does not provide relief for al-
leged violations of the law of nations.3
However, Kiobel was “careful to leave open a number of significant
questions regarding the reach and interpretation” of the ATS.4 One such
question is if the ATS reaches tortious conduct that takes place outside the
country when other factors link the case to the United States. This ques-
tion is the subject of a new circuit split. In Balintulo v. Daimler AG, South
African nationals brought a case under the ATS against local subsidiaries
of Daimler, Ford, and IBM, all multi-national corporations incorporated in
the United States, alleging that the subsidiaries aided and abetted the
South African government in crimes of apartheid, including arbitrary ar-
rest, detention, torture, and extrajudicial killing of family members.5 The
Second Circuit found the case to be precluded by Kiobel, noting that
“[t]he opinion of the Supreme Court in Kiobel plainly bars common-law
suits, like this one, alleging violations of customary international law based
solely on conduct occurring abroad.”6 Similarly, in a case where children
of former union leaders who were allegedly murdered in Colombia sued
Drummond Company, Inc., a closely-held corporation with its principal
place of business in Birmingham, Alabama, and its subsidiary, Drummond
Ltd., the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s granting of summary
judgment to defendants, holding that the presumption against extraterrito-
rial application of the ATS applied.7
2. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662 (2013) (often referred
to as “Kiobel II” to differentiate it from the Supreme Court’s order on March 5, 2012 for
reargument on the issue of the ATS’s extraterritoriality after hearing oral arguments on the
separate issue of corporate liability under the ATS, an issue not discussed in this Note). See
Lyle Denniston, Kiobel to be expanded and reargued, SCOTUSBLOG, (Mar. 5, 2012, 2:01
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/03/kiobel-to-be-reargued/.
3. Id. at 1669. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joined. Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opin-
ion; Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Thomas joined; and Jus-
tice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, but not in the opinion, in which
Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined; see also Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d
576, 585 (11th Cir. 2015) (discussing the “narrow holding of Kiobel”), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
1168 (2016).
4. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also id. at 1669–70 (Alito, J., concurring) (“This
formulation obviously leaves much unanswered, and perhaps there is wisdom in the Court’s
preference for this narrow approach.”); id. at 1673 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment)
(“[A]s the Court uses its ‘presumption against extraterritorial application,’ it offers only lim-
ited help in deciding the question presented.”).
5. See Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2013).
6. Id. at 182.
7. Baloco v. Drummond Co., Inc., 767 F.3d 1229, 1235–36 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. de-
nied, 136 S. Ct. 410 (2015).
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But in Doe I v. Nestle8 and Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology,
Inc.,9 the Ninth and Fourth Circuits put forward opinions that indicate that
the ATS may provide relief to claims even where the conduct or violation
occurred abroad. In Nestle, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s
dismissal of a claim brought by victims of child slavery in the Ivory Coast
and remanded for further proceedings, noting that Kiobel “does not ex-
plain the nature of this [touch and concern] test, except to say that it is not
met when an ATS plaintiff asserts a cause of action against a foreign cor-
poration based solely on foreign conduct.”10 Similarly, in Al Shimari,
where Iraqi nationals and former detainees at Abu Ghraib detention
center in Iraq brought a case alleging abuse and torture against a military
contractor headquartered in Virginia, the Fourth Circuit found that such a
case could potentially be heard because it “manifest[s] a close connection
to United States territory.”11
The few articles that have examined the post-Kiobel case law argue
that American courts should allow a more expansive reading of the ATS
to ensure that the United States upholds its international legal obligations
to provide victims access to judicial remedies,12 and that such an approach
is consistent with international jurisdictional norms.13 However, these ap-
proaches alone may fall short of a persuasive solution for U.S. courts be-
cause in Kiobel the Supreme Court stated that “there is no indication that
the ATS was passed to make the United States a uniquely hospitable fo-
rum for the enforcement of international norms.”14 Because international
human rights norms alone have not been sufficient to ensure that the
scope of the ATS reaches victims of abuse when their cases have a clear
nexus with the United States, international and domestic human rights
lawyers alike should look to domestic due process and choice of law prin-
ciples to demonstrate why the ATS provides a remedy for some violations
of the law of nations that occur abroad.
This Note draws parallels to domestic due process and choice of law
principles to ground the more expansive post-Kiobel reading of the ATS.
8. 766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2014) [hereinafter Nestle].
9. 758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014).
10. Nestle, 766 F.3d at 1027–28. The Court remanded the case to allow the plaintiffs
the opportunity to amend their complaint in light of Kiobel to allege that some of the activity
underlying their ATS claim took place in the United States and stated that “we are unable to
conclude that amendment would be futile because unlike the claims at issue in Kiobel II, the
plaintiffs contend that part of the conduct underlying their claims occurred within the United
States.” Id. at 1028. See also Jennifer M. Green, The Rule of Law at A Crossroad: Enforcing
Corporate Responsibility in International Investment Through the Alien Tort Statute, 35 U.
PA. J. INT’L L. 1085, 1102 (2014).
11. Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 528.
12. See, e.g., Gwynne L. Skinner, Beyond Kiobel: Providing Access to Judicial Reme-
dies for Violations of International Human Rights Norms by Transnational Business in A New
(Post-Kiobel) World, 46 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 158, 188 (2014).
13. See, e.g., Ursula Tracy Doyle, The Evidence of Things Not Seen: Divining Balanc-
ing Factors from Kiobel’s “Touch and Concern” Test, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 443, 447–48 (2015).
14. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1668 (2013).
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While fully acknowledging that the question of the scope of the ATS ad-
dresses “the power of the courts to entertain cases concerned with a cer-
tain subject,”15 an issue distinct from personal jurisdiction, which refers to
a court’s power to bring a person into its adjudicative process, or choice of
law, which refers to which law a court should apply,16 this Note argues that
many of the concerns animating the scope of the ATS can be addressed by
domestic personal jurisdiction and choice of law cases. Grounding ATS
argumentation in domestic jurisprudence rather than solely in interna-
tional law obligations is important because the judicial concerns about the
ATS mirror those apparent in ordinary personal jurisdiction and choice of
law cases. In Kiobel, the Court pointed to two specific concerns: First, that
a broad ATS will set the precedent for other countries to hale Americans
into their courts17 (a concern with overlaps to personal jurisdiction cases),
and, second, that a broad ATS will precipitate “unintended clashes be-
tween our laws and those of other nations which could result in interna-
tional discord”18 (a concern with overlaps to choice of law cases).
This Note explores the post-Kiobel ATS cases and argues that the
Fourth Circuit’s approach to considering claims that manifest a close con-
nection to the United States as potentially entitling the plaintiff to relief
under the ATS is preferable to approaches that categorically bar claims
when the alleged conduct has occurred abroad. Part I describes the Kiobel
decision in more depth and the subsequent ATS case law to outline the
contours of recent circuit cases. Part II demonstrates how domestic per-
sonal jurisdiction and choice of law principles weigh in favor of a more
expansive reading of the ATS, as adopted by the Fourth Circuit, and com-
pares the ATS to other areas of law, including securities and antitrust law.
Part III puts forward a three-part disjunctive test that courts could use to
add more definition to the Fourth Circuit approach in determining if a
claim touches and concerns the territory of the United States in a way that
allows U.S. federal courts to consider it under the ATS: If (1) the defen-
dant is a U.S. citizen or a U.S. corporate domiciliary; or (2) the defendant
has conducted explicit planning or extensive activity in furtherance of the
violation in the United States; or (3) the violation is clearly and manifestly
orchestrated to target the United States, with the intent of harming the
United States and its citizens, then the claim overcomes the ATS presump-
tion against extraterritoriality.
15. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713–14 (2004); see also Al Shimari, 758
F.3d at 520 (“In this appeal, we consider whether a federal district court has subject matter
jurisdiction to consider certain civil claims seeking damages against an American corporation
. . . . The primary issue on appeal concerns whether the Alien Tort Statute . . . provides a
jurisdictional basis for the plaintiffs’ alleged violations of international law, despite the pre-
sumption against extraterritorial application of acts of Congress.”).
16. See Personal Jurisdiction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); Choice of
Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
17. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664.
18. Id. (citing EEOC v. Arabian American Oil, Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).
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PART I. THE “TOUCH AND CONCERN” TEST AND POST-KIOBEL CASES
UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
A. The Kiobel Enunciation of the “Touch and Concern” Test
In Kiobel, the major question before the Supreme Court was whether
the ATS extends to torts that have occurred abroad—in other words, if the
ATS applies extraterritorially.19 In a decision by Chief Justice Roberts, the
Court held that the ATS does not extend to claims brought by foreign
plaintiffs, against foreign defendants, for conduct abroad, relying primarily
on the presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. law, or that
“[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial applica-
tion, it has none.”20 The Court reiterated that the presumption against
extraterritorial application of U.S. statutes reflects the “longstanding prin-
ciple of American law that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent
appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States” because “Congress ordinarily legislates with respect to do-
mestic, not foreign matters.”21 The Court stated that “there is no indica-
tion that the ATS was passed to make the United States a uniquely
hospitable forum for the enforcement of international norms”22 and that
an expansive reading of the ATS could lead to potential “unintended
clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result in
international discord” and raise a “danger of unwarranted judicial inter-
ference in the conduct of foreign policy.”23 Additionally, the Court noted
that accepting the petitioners’ view “would imply that other nations . . .
could hale our citizens into their courts.”24 The decision ultimately held
that on the facts at hand, “[A]ll the relevant conduct took place outside
the United States. And even where the claims touch and concern the terri-
tory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace
the presumption against extraterritorial application.”25
This final “touch and concern” language requires further interpreta-
tion to determine what claims are sufficiently close to the United States to
overcome the ATS presumption against extraterritoriality. As Justice
Breyer noted in his concurrence of the judgment in Kiobel, the majority
“makes clear” that a statutory claim might sometimes “touch and con-
cern” the territory of the United States with sufficient force to displace the
presumption, but the Court “leaves for another day the determination of
19. The ATS, passed as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, is a one-sentence statute
providing that, “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
20. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664 (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S.
247, 248 (2010)).
21. Id. at 1672 (quoting Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255).
22. Id. at 1668.
23. Id. at 1664.
24. Id. at 1669.
25. Id.
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just when the presumption against extraterritoriality might be
‘overcome.’”26
B. Categorical Bars Where Tortious Activity Occurred Abroad
After the Kiobel decision, some lower courts dismissed plaintiff claims
under the ATS if the tortious activity occurred abroad.27 For example, in
July 2013 in Giraldo v. Drummond Co., the Northern District Court of
Alabama dismissed a case in which plaintiffs alleged that the head of the
Drummond mining company, headquartered in Birmingham, took actions
that involved funding paramilitaries in Colombia who allegedly murdered
union activists while providing security services against the FARC rebel
group for Drummond’s rail line and facilities.28 The court granted the de-
fendants’ motions for summary judgment because “[p]laintiffs’ claims can-
not withstand the seismic shift that Kiobel has caused on the legal
landscape pertinent here.”29 The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument
that because the Drummond CEO made the decision to provide material
support to the paramilitary group at the company headquarters in Ala-
bama—and thus within the United States, the ATS’s presumption against
extraterritorial application had been overcome. Rather, the court held that
if a complaint alleges activity in both foreign and domestic spheres, a U.S.
statute can only be applied abroad if the event on which the statute fo-
cuses occurred in the United States. Under this reasoning, the Northern
District Court of Alabama held that because “the ATS focuses on the torts
of extrajudicial killings and war crimes” and these alleged injuries by
Drummond occurred abroad, the claim was barred in U.S. courts.30
The Eleventh Circuit subsequently affirmed the decision stating, “Dis-
placement of the presumption will be warranted if the claims have a U.S.
focus and adequate relevant conduct occurs within the United States.”31
Importantly, however, the court noted that “although we find that the U.S.
citizenship and corporate status of Defendants, the U.S. interests impli-
cated by Plaintiffs’ claims, and the U.S. conduct alleged are relevant in
considering whether Plaintiffs’ claims have a U.S. focus . . . , we must con-
26. Id. at 1673 (Breyer, J., concurring).
27. Green, supra note 10, at 1101.
28. Giraldo v. Drummond Co., No. 09-CV-1041, 2013 WL 3873960 (N.D. Ala. July 25,
2013); see also id. at 1103.
29. Giraldo, 2013 WL 3873960, at *3.
30. Id. at *8 (employing the “focus” test of Morrison). See Morrison v. Nat’l Australia
Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266 (2010) (“[W]e think that the focus of the Exchange Act is not
upon the place where the deception originated, but upon purchases and sales of securities in
the United States.”). The Giraldo court cited Morrison in support of its holding. “As Morri-
son succinctly stated, ‘the presumption against extraterritorial application would be a craven
watchdog indeed if it retreated to its kennel whenever some domestic activity is in-
volved . . . . ’”. 2013 WL 3873960, at *8.
31. Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576, 592 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
1168 (2016).
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clude that, in these circumstances, those factors are not sufficient to dis-
place the presumption against extraterritoriality.”32
In August 2013, the Second Circuit issued a decision in Balintulo v.
Daimler AG,33 the case described in the Introduction concerning South
African plaintiffs suing local subsidiaries of Daimler, Ford, and IBM for
allegedly aiding and abetting the South African government in crimes of
apartheid, which also espoused a type of “focus” inquiry. The South Afri-
can claimants alleged that the subsidiaries of U.S.-incorporated multina-
tional corporations sold “cars and computers to the South African
government, thus facilitating the apartheid regime’s innumerable race-
based depredations and injustices, including rape, torture, and extrajudi-
cial killings.”34 The plaintiffs argued that the defendants’ corporate citi-
zenship in the United States was enough to meet the Kiobel threshold of
claims that “touch and concern the territory of the United States” with
“sufficient force” to displace the presumption against extraterritorial ap-
plication.35 The Second Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that cor-
porate citizenship in the United States alone is enough to displace the
Kiobel presumption, reasoning that Kiobel “focus[ed] solely on the loca-
tion of the relevant ‘conduct’ or ‘violation.’” 36 The court stated that the
Kiobel majority framed the question presented on the location of the rele-
vant conduct or violation three times and “focused solely on the location
of the relevant ‘conduct’ or ‘violation’ at least eight more times in other
parts of its eight-page opinion.”37 The court concluded that Kiobel ex-
pressly held that claims under the ATS cannot be brought for extraterrito-
rial violations of the law of nations, and “in all cases, therefore, the ATS
does not permit claims based on illegal conduct that occurred entirely in
the territory of another sovereign.”38
32. Id. at 600. The court appeared most swayed by the plaintiffs’ arguments that the
defendants’ U.S.-based conduct distinguished their claims from that of the plaintiffs in Ki-
obel. However, the court stated that “our precedent indicates that the sufficiency question—
whether the claims do so with ‘sufficient force’ or to the ‘degree necessary’ to warrant dis-
placement—will only be answered in the affirmative if enough relevant conduct occurred
within the United States.” Id. at 597. See also Baloco v. Drummond Co., Inc., 767 F.3d 1229,
1236 (11th Cir. 2014) (“First, the extrajudicial killings and war crimes asserted . . . occurred in
Colombia. Second, although the two Drummond entities, Adkins, and Tracy are United
States nationals, the majority in Kiobel did not place significant weight on the defendants’
nationality; certainly none sufficient to warrant the extraterritorial application of the ATS to
situations in which the alleged relevant conduct occurred abroad.”), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
410 (2015); Cardona v. Chiquita Brands International, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1191 (11th Cir.
2014) (“The torture, if the allegations are taken as true, occurred outside the territorial juris-
diction of the United States . . . . There is no allegation that any torture occurred on U.S.
territory, or that any other act constituting a tort in terms of the ATS touched or concerned
the territory of the United States with any force.”), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1842 (2015).
33. 727 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2013).
34. Id. at 180.
35. Id. at 189.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 192.
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The Second Circuit affirmed its jurisprudence in Mastafa v. Chevron
Corp. in October 2014, a case brought by five Iraqi nationals who alleged
that defendants, including U.S.-based Chevron Corp., illicitly diverted
money to the Saddam Hussein regime in violation of customary interna-
tional law.39 In Mastafa, the court stated, “We disagree with the conten-
tion that a defendant’s U.S. citizenship has any relevance to the
jurisdictional analysis.”40 However, the court did build upon its previous
jurisprudence by determining that “domestic contacts” are key: “An eval-
uation of the presumption’s application to a particular case is essentially
an inquiry into whether the domestic contacts are sufficient to avoid trig-
gering the presumption at all.”41 The court considered the plaintiffs’ alle-
gations of oil purchases, financing of oil purchases, delivery of oil to
another U.S. company, use of a New York escrow account, and New York-
based financing arrangements to be relevant conduct that “‘touches and
concerns’ the United States.”42 The plaintiffs’ claims, however, failed on
other grounds.43
C. Reopening the Door to ATS Claims that Manifest a Close
Connection to the United States
Some courts have begun to develop a post-Kiobel jurisprudence that
considers more than where the conduct or violation occurred in deciding if
the claim touches and concerns the United States with sufficient force to
displace the Kiobel presumption. In May 2013, a month after the Supreme
Court handed down its decision in Kiobel, the District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia issued an opinion that found as a matter of first impres-
sion that the 1998 bombing outside the United States Embassy in Nairobi
“touched and concerned” the United States with sufficient force to dis-
place the presumption against extraterritorial application of the ATS.44
The court stated that Kiobel “may have left open one, albeit narrow ave-
nue for jurisdiction over acts that occurred outside the United States”45
and that “[s]urely, if any circumstances were to fit the Court’s framework
of ‘touching and concerning the United States with sufficient force,’ it
would be a terrorist attack that 1) was plotted in part within the United
States, and 2) was directed at a United States Embassy and its employ-
ees.”46 Judge Facciola reasoned:
39. Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 174 (2d Cir. 2014).
40. Id. at 189.
41. Id. at 182.
42. Id. at 195.
43. Id. at 195–196 (“The complaint fails plausibly to plead that defendants’ conduct
related to aiding and abetting the alleged violations of customary international law was inten-
tional, and accordingly, the conduct cannot state a claim for aiding and abetting liability
under the ATS and thus cannot form the basis for our jurisdiction.”).
44. Mwani v. Bin Laden and Al Qaeda, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2013).
45. Id. at 4.
46. Id. at 5.
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It is obvious that a case involving an attack on the United
States Embassy in Nairobi is tied much more closely to our na-
tional interests than a case whose only tie to our nation is a corpo-
rate presence here. Ample evidence has been presented for me to
conclude that the events at issue in this case were directed at the
United States government, with the intention of harming this
country and its citizens. As noted by the D.C. Circuit, this attack
was orchestrated “not only to kill both American and Kenyan em-
ployees inside the building, but to cause pain and sow terror in the
embassy’s home country, the United States.”47
However, the court decided to immediately certify the issue to the
Court of Appeals, explaining that such an approach was preferable to
“proceeding to the complicated issue of choice of law and the fact-inten-
sive task of issuing bellwether findings that will apply to over 500 plain-
tiffs,”48 and ordered any further proceedings in the case be stayed.
Three months later, in Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Scott Lively,49
where the defendant, a U.S. citizen, was found to have planned and man-
aged a campaign to physically harm the LGBTI community in Uganda, the
District Court of Massachusetts pointed to the defendant’s status as a U.S.
citizen and the planning activities that occurred in the United States, and
found that jurisdiction over the defendant in the case “fits comfortably”
within the Kiobel limits.50
Then, in June 2014, the Fourth Circuit became the first circuit to use a
“fact-based analysis”51 to hold that the ATS reached an alleged tort that
occurred on foreign soil. In Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc.,
the Fourth Circuit held that the claim brought forward by former detain-
ees of the Abu Ghraib detention center in Iraq against a Virginia-based
military contractor for abuse and torture “touched and concerned” the ter-
ritory of the United States with sufficient force. Among the alleged exam-
ples of mistreatment, the plaintiffs stated that they had been “repeatedly
beaten,” “shot in the leg,” “repeatedly shot in the head with a taser gun,”
“subjected to mock execution,” “threatened with unleashed dogs,”
“stripped naked,” “kept in a cage,” “beaten on [the] genitals with a stick,”
“forcibly subjected to sexual acts,” and “forced to watch” the “rape[ ] [of]
a female detainee.”52 According to the plaintiffs, perpetrators conducted
the acts during the night shift to minimize the risk of detection by nonpar-
ticipants.53 The Fourth Circuit overturned the district court’s ruling that
47. Id. (quoting Mwani v. Bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
48. Id.
49. 960 F. Supp. 2d 304 (D. Mass. 2013).
50. Id. at 322.
51. Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 527 (4th Cir. 2014).
52. Id. at 521 (alterations in original).
53. Id. at 521–22 (noting that investigations conducted by the Defense Department
concluded that CACI interrogators directed or participated in some of the abuses, along with
a number of military personnel, and citing Report of Maj. Gen. Taguba 48; Maj. Gen. George
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the presumption against extraterritoriality barred the suit under the ATS,
stating:
 We conclude that the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel does
not foreclose the plaintiff’s claims under the Alien Tort Statute,
and that the district court erred in reaching a contrary conclusion.
Upon applying the fact-based inquiry articulated by the Supreme
Court in Kiobel, we hold that the plaintiff’s claims “touch and
concern” the territory of the United States with sufficient force to
displace the presumption against extraterritorial application of the
Alien Tort Statute.54
The Al Shimari court first noted that “the [Supreme] Court broadly
stated that the ‘claims,’ rather than the alleged tortious conduct, must
touch and concern United States territory with sufficient force, suggesting
that courts must consider all the facts that give rise to ATS claims, includ-
ing the parties’ identities and their relationship to the causes of action.”55
The Fourth Circuit rejected the defendants’ contention that the sole mate-
rial consideration to determining whether the case could proceed under
the ATS was the fact that the alleged torture occurred in Iraq and not in
the United States, which the defendants argued would subject their claim
to the same failed outcome as the plaintiff claims in Kiobel. Rather, the
court stated, “[T]he clear implication of the Court’s ‘touch and concern’
language is that courts should not assume that the presumption categori-
cally bars cases that manifest a close connection to United States terri-
tory.”56 The court continued by stating, “[I]t is not sufficient merely to say
that because the actual injuries were inflicted abroad, the claims do not
touch and concern United States territory.”57 Furthermore, the Fourth
Circuit noted that Justice Alito’s concurrence in Kiobel advocating a
stronger presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. law
showed that the majority’s take on the presumption against extraterritorial
application could not have been a categorical bar against all claims where
the tort occurs abroad, otherwise Justice Alito would have had no reason
to write a concurring opinion.58
Applying this fact-based analysis to the case, the Fourth Circuit noted
that the allegations of torture were committed by U.S. citizens, employed
by an American corporation (CACI) whose corporate headquarters are
R. Fay, Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th Military Intelligence
Brigade 7–8, 84, 86–87, 89, 116–17, 132–35 (2004)).
54. Id. at 520. The Court remanded the case for findings on other grounds of this
specific tort claim raised any nonjusticiable political questions relating to the war in Iraq.
55. Id. at 527 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 281 (9th ed. 2009) that defines
“claim” as the “aggregate of operative facts giving rise to a right enforceable by a court”).
56. Id. at 528.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 527.
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based in Fairfax County, Virginia.59 The court also noted that “[t]he al-
leged torture [in Iraq] occurred at a military facility operated by United
States government personnel.”60 The employees who allegedly partici-
pated in the acts were hired by CACI in the United States to fulfill the
terms of a contract between the United States Department of the Interior
and CACI.61 Last, the contract between the Department of Interior and
CACI was issued by a government office in Arizona, and CACI was to
collect payments by mailing invoices to government accounting offices in
Colorado.62 Weighing these factors, the Al Shimari court unanimously
held that the plaintiffs’ claims touched and concerned the territory of the
United States with sufficient force to displace the presumption against ex-
traterritorial application of the ATS.63
In late 2014, the Ninth Circuit weighed in with its ATS jurisprudence
when it issued two decisions, Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc.64 and Mujica v.
AirScan Inc.65 In Nestle, a class action brought by alleged former child
slaves from the Ivory Coast against Nestle USA, Inc., Archer Daniels Mid-
land Company, Cargill Incorporated Company, and Cargill Cocoa for al-
legedly aiding and abetting child slavery, the Ninth Circuit determined, in
contrast to the Second Circuit, that the Kiobel “touch and concern” test is
not a “focus” test.66 The court remanded the case to allow plaintiffs to
amend the complaint.67 In Mujica, where Colombian citizens brought ac-
tion against two U.S. corporations for alleged complicity in the Colombian
military’s bombing of a village, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs
only “speculate[d] that some of [the] conduct . . . could have occurred in
the United States” and that such speculation was not an adequate basis on
which to allow the plaintiffs’ claims to go forward.68 The court, however,
stated that U.S. citizenship may be “one factor that, in conjunction with
other factors, can establish a sufficient connection between an ATS claim
and the territory of the United States to satisfy Kiobel,” but that U.S. citi-
59. Id. at 528–29 (“Here, the plaintiffs’ claims allege acts of torture committed by
United States citizens who were employed by an American corporation, CACI, which has
corporate headquarters located in Fairfax County, Virginia. The alleged torture occurred at a
military facility operated by United States government personnel.”).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 529.
63. Id. at 530.
64. 766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2014).
65. 771 F.3d 580 (9th Cir. 2014).
66. 766 F.3d at 1028.
67. Id. at 1027–28 (“Rather than attempt to apply the amorphous touch and concern
test on the record currently before us, we conclude that the plaintiffs should have the oppor-
tunity to amend their complaint . . . .”); see also Michael Congjiu & Stefan Marculewicz,
Supply Chain Management And The Alien Tort Claims Act, LAW360, (Oct. 28, 2014, 11:28
AM), http://www.law360.com/appellate/articles/590272.
68. 771 F.3d at 592.
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zenship without any U.S.-based conduct was insufficient to displace the
presumption.69
The below section will discuss principles of domestic personal jurisdic-
tion and choice of law jurisprudence to shed light on a workable test for
the scope of the ATS in what has become, as demonstrated by the above, a
“crowded legal landscape”70 of approaches.
PART II. THE ATS & AMERICAN JURISDICTION AND CHOICE OF LAW
JURISPRUDENCE
The territorial concerns that animate the debate on how far the ATS
reaches trace many of the same concerns that underlie domestic personal
jurisdiction and choice of law cases. While this Note fully acknowledges
that the question of what conduct a statute reaches is not synonymous with
personal jurisdiction, which refers to a court’s power to bring a person into
its adjudicative process,71 or choice of law, which refers to what law the
court should prescribe,72 this Note uses personal jurisdiction and choice of
law cases as a starting point to evaluate the scope of the ATS. Mapping
these principles onto the debate over the reach of the ATS shows that an
approach that considers factors beyond only where the injury occurred—
such as the nationality of the defendant, the location and extent of the
planning activity, or whether the United States was targeted—is prefera-
ble to bright-line territorial rules. Personal jurisdiction and choice of law
cases also show that a categorical rule turning solely on the place of the
violation may be an antiquated way to determine the extraterritorial reach
of a statute in a given case.
A. Due Process & The Return to Parochial Territoriality Principles?
The evolution of domestic personal jurisdiction cases shows that the
due process concerns surrounding the ATS are not unique to this statute
and supports providing a path for hearing some cases under the ATS even
if the injury or violation occurred abroad. This section will seek to show
how domestic due process cases support the Fourth Circuit’s statement
that the “touch and concern” inquiry articulated in Kiobel requires “con-
sidering a broader range of facts than the location where the plaintiffs
actually sustained their injuries.”73
In Kiobel, the Supreme Court voiced a concern about the due process
implications of the ATS having a broad geographical reach. “[A]ccepting
petitioners’ view would imply that other nations, also applying the law of
nations, could hale our citizens into their courts for alleged violations of
the law of nations occurring in the United States, or anywhere else in the
69. Id. at 594 & n.9 (“We do not contend that this factor is irrelevant to the Kiobel
inquiry; we merely hold that it is not dispositive of that inquiry.”).
70. Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576, 592 (11th Cir. 2015).
71. See Personal Jurisdiction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
72. See Choice of Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
73. Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 529 (4th Cir. 2014).
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world.”74 However, this Kiobel language does not compel a strict territo-
rial framework.
First, many of the cases arising under the ATS involve U.S. corpora-
tions or their subsidiaries, which makes the analysis easier under personal
jurisdiction principles. From the earliest jurisdiction cases, courts have
found that being domiciled in a given jurisdiction is sufficient for a court in
that jurisdiction to hale the individual into court for the purposes of a
personal judgment, under the rationale that the state which accords privi-
leges and protections to a party also exacts responsibilities on that party.75
Additionally, as the Eleventh Circuit recognized in Doe v. Drummond
Co., U.S. corporate status is “relevant” to the touch and concern test be-
cause “[i]f the defendants are U.S. citizens, some of the foreign policy con-
cerns that the presumption against extraterritorial application is intended
to reduce may be assuaged or inapplicable, since we would not be haling
foreign nationals into U.S. courts to defend themselves.”76
Additionally, as the Al Shimari court noted, the Supreme Court in
Kiobel broadly stated that “even where the claims”77—rather than the al-
leged tortious conduct—touch and concern the territory of the United
States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption
against extraterritoriality, which suggests that courts should “consider . . .
the parties’ identities and their relationship to the causes of action.”78 This
interpretation of the ATS would not deprive Kiobel of its force; this inter-
pretation still stands in marked contrast with the pre-Kiobel ATS cases in
which U.S. courts regularly heard cases on the merits even when the case
had no connection to U.S. territory.
Second, personal jurisdictional principles weigh in favor of allowing
the ATS to reach cases where the defendant, even if not a U.S. citizen or
U.S. corporate domiciliary, has purposely availed itself of the benefits of
business in the United States, and has used this presence in the United
States to conduct explicit planning or extensive activity in furtherance of
the international law violation. Personal jurisdiction principles also sup-
port the ATS reaching cases where the defendant has clearly and mani-
festly targeted the United States.
In 1945, when the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, it ushered in a new era rejecting strict terri-
torialism by holding that courts could hale defendants residing in other
jurisdictions into courts so long as certain “minimum contacts” existed be-
tween the defendant’s activity and the state’s law such that the suit “does
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”79 The
74. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
75. See generally Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
76. Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576, 595 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
1168 (2016).
77. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (emphasis added).
78. Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 527.
79. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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Supreme Court extended this principle in Hanson v. Denckla by holding
that jurisdiction could be found when a party “purposely avails itself of the
privileges of conducting activities with the forum State, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws.”80 Thus, the International Shoe Co.
case and its progeny rejected a strictly territorial approach to due process
cases concerning foreigners.
Furthermore, in Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of
California, the Supreme Court indicated that the determination of the rea-
sonableness of the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign defendant de-
pends on an evaluation of several factors, including the burden on the
defendant.81 The Court held that the “unique burdens placed upon one
who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system should have significant
weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching the long arm of per-
sonal jurisdiction over national borders,” but that “[w]hen minimum con-
tacts have been established, often the interests of the plaintiff and the
forum in the exercise of jurisdiction will justify even the serious burdens
placed on the alien defendant.”82 This language demonstrates that the for-
eign nature of the defendant is not always dispositive as to whether a U.S.
court has personal jurisdiction. The interests of providing a remedy for
serious torts that have occurred abroad, but have been planned by an alien
defendant in the United States, likely constitutes one such instance that
justifies burdening the alien defendant.
In line with this reasoning, if the international law violation is clearly
and manifestly orchestrated to harm the United States, the claim should
be deemed to overcome the ATS presumption against extraterritoriality.
For example, the case of Mwani v. Bin Laden,83 the action brought against
Usama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda on behalf of Kenyan victims of the 1998
bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Kenya, should be one that American
courts can hear on the merits. The interest of the United States in ob-
taining a remedy for victims killed or injured in an attack clearly targeting
the United States is great enough to overcome burdens placed on the
defendants.
B. Choice of Law with “Specific, Universal, and Obligatory” Crimes
Domestic choice of law cases also support the Fourth Circuit’s ap-
proach in considering more than where the plaintiffs sustained injuries or
where the violation occurred when determining whether a plaintiff’s claim
has overcome the ATS’s presumption against extraterritoriality.
The Supreme Court in Kiobel highlighted the need for judicial caution
when it comes to applying U.S. law in cases involving nationals of other
countries. The Court pointed out that the presumption against extraterri-
80. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
81. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, Solano Cty., 480 U.S. 102,
113 (1987).
82. Id. at 114.
83. 947 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013).
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torial application of U.S. law reflects the idea that “United States law gov-
erns domestically but does not rule the world.”84 This presumption “serves
to protect against unintended clashes between the laws of the United
States and those of other nations which could result in international dis-
cord.”85 The presumption is meant to provide “a stable background
against which Congress can legislate with predictable effects.”86
However, the post-Kiobel opinions that have drawn a relatively strict
line for all claims where the violation occurred abroad may be unnecessa-
rily limiting the geographic reach of the ATS. For example, following the
“focus” language of cases like Giraldo, the case concerning an Alabama
company alleged to have aided and abetted Colombian rebels that found
that the ATS “arises only if the event on which the statute focuses did not
occur abroad,”87 will likely unnecessarily sacrifice fairness for judicial
clarity.
First, the results of the Giraldo “focus” language appear to mirror the
flawed results of cases such as Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. v.
Carroll,88 the emblematic case from 1892 that showed how strict territorial
rules sacrifice fairness for clear line-drawing. In Alabama Great Southern
Railroad, a freight train brakeman suffered crippling injuries after one of
the links between two cars broke after the train passed out of Alabama
into Mississippi. The Alabama Supreme Court held that the Mississippi
negligence law unfavorable to the plaintiff—rather than a more pro-plain-
tiff Alabama law—applied, even though all evidence showed that the link
was defective when it left the station in Alabama, the negligence of Ala-
bama employees led to the link break, and that the employment relation-
ship was centered in Alabama.89
The result of Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co., where the court
applied the law of the state where the last event necessary to make an
actor liable for an alleged tort took place, rather than the law of the state
that had the potential to shape conduct of resident railroad companies,
demonstrates the arbitrary results of the traditional choice of law rules.
These results eventually served as the impetus for the choice of law
revolution in the 1950s.90 The Second Restatement on the Conflict of
84. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (quoting
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007)).
85. Id. (quoting EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).
86. Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 261 (2010).
87. Giraldo v. Drummond Co., No. 09-CV-1041, 2013 WL 3873960, at *9 (N.D. Ala.
July 25, 2013).
88. 97 Ala. 126 (1892).
89. See id. at 127; see also James P. George, False Conflicts and Faulty Analyses: Judi-
cial Misuse of Governmental Interests in the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 23 REV.
LITIG. 489, 503–04 (2004).
90. Compare RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378–380 (1934) (stating that “the
law of the place of wrong” determines legal injury, liability-creating conduct, standard of
care, causation, and contributory negligence in tort cases) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971) (“[T]he factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of
law include the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of
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Laws ultimately rejected the lex loci principle in favor of other factors it
deemed relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law, such as the
protection of justified expectations of the parties.91 A categorical territo-
rial rule for the ATS that leaves little room for applying law that will in-
centivize better conduct on the part of defendants or effectuate the
reasonable expectations of parties appears to run afoul of the lesson that
courts learned in Alabama Great Southern Railroad.
Furthermore, as the Ninth Circuit explained in response to defend-
ants’ arguments in favor of a “focus” test in Nestle, such a test is likely not
appropriate in the ATS context. In Nestle, defendants argued that the
touch and concern test is substantially the same as the “focus” test set out
in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., the Supreme Court case that
established that the presumption against extraterritorial application of
U.S. law applies to the Securities Exchange Act.92 Under the Morrison
focus test, “courts first determine the ‘focus of congressional concern’ for a
statute, and allow the statute to be applied to a course of conduct if the
events coming within the statute’s focus occurred domestically.”93 In Nes-
tle, the Ninth Circuit stated that Kiobel “did not explicitly adopt Morri-
son’s focus test, and chose to use the phrase ‘touch and concern’ rather
than the term ‘focus’ when articulating the legal standard it did adopt.”94
Additionally, as the Nestle court pointed out, Morrison used the focus in-
quiry as a tool of statutory construction to determine the scope of the
Securities Exchange Act95 and that “[s]ince the focus test turns on discern-
ing Congress’s intent when passing a statute, it cannot sensibly be applied
to ATS claims, which are common law claims based on international legal
norms.”96
Also, unlike the securities context where “[t]he probability of incom-
patibility with the applicable laws of other countries is so obvious,”97 the
ATS’s substantive law—customary international law—is, at least in the-
ory, universally applicable, and thus presents a far lower risk of conflict of
law problems with foreign nations. The very essence of the ATS is that it
provides a cause of action for a violation of the law of nations, which has
the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of
those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expec-
tations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability
and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be
applied.”); see, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963).
91. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6, supra note 90.
92. Doe I v. Nestle, 766 F.3d 1013, 1028 (9th Cir. 2014); Morrison v. Nat’l Australia
Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 265 (2010).
93. Id. (quoting Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266) (internal quotations omitted in original).
94. Id.
95. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266 (finding that the “focus of the Exchange Act is not
upon the place where the deception originated, but upon purchases and sales of securities in
the United States”).
96. Nestle, 766 F.3d at 1028.
97. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 269.
Spring 2016] To Touch and Concern the U.S. 555
been defined as those crimes that are “specific, universal, and obliga-
tory.”98 As Charles Wright and Arthur Miller state, it is generally ac-
cepted that the ATS provides jurisdiction over cases “involving various
forms of official or state sponsored torture, genocide, war crimes, crimes
against humanity, as well as forced labor, servitude or slavery.”99 Previous
ATS cases have demonstrated just how high of a bar the violation needs to
be to meet the customary international law threshold. For example, in the
pre-Kiobel ATS case of Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., Judge Pos-
ner held that international practice did not lead to “a crisp rule” that em-
ploying child labor violates customary international law, and thus affirmed
the lower court’s summary judgment for the defendants.100
Thus, unlike the Securities Exchange Act, where the substantive pro-
visions may differ widely from securities statutes of other countries, the
ATS prohibits only the most egregious crimes that are outlawed in the vast
majority of States. As the Al Shimari court found, the ATS is a “jurisdic-
tional vehicle provided under United States law” through which plaintiffs
can enforce the law of nations. “[A]ny substantive norm enforced through
an ATS claim necessarily is recognized by other nations as being actiona-
ble.”101 Under this Note’s proposed test, the ATS would still not provide
relief for claims that fall below this high bar of universal illegality, such as
a claim recently brought forward by Cameroonian customers of a power
company and its Virginia parent corporation seeking relief for injuries re-
sulting from the power company’s alleged provision of faulty and danger-
ous electrical supply.102 In sum, the concern about U.S. law overstepping
the laws of other countries is not as salient a concern in ATS litigation as
in securities litigation, where the relevant statute is much more complex
and particular.
In fact, the universality of crimes for which the ATS provides a rem-
edy makes it a statute less likely to lead to conflicts of laws than other
statutes, such as the Sherman Antitrust Act, which may apply extraterrito-
rially if a plaintiff can prove actual harm occurred in the United States and
that the conduct was sufficiently direct, substantial, and reasonably fore-
98. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004).
99. 14A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PRO-
CEDURE JURISDICTION § 3661.2 (4th ed. 2014). However, it should be noted that the amount
of damages recoverable, what discovery is available in litigation, what individual actions may
be joined in a single suit, what attorneys’ fees are recoverable, and other matters pointed out
by the Supreme Court in Morrison, 561 U.S. at 269, would likely still differ among
jurisdictions.
100. Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., LLC, 643 F.3d 1013, 1023, 1025 (7th Cir.
2011).
101. Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 530 (4th Cir. 2014).
102. See generally William v. AES Corp., 28 F. Supp. 3d 553 (E.D. Va. 2014) (holding
that “[s]ubstandard power supply falls well outside the bounds of universally recognized
norms of international law”).
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seeable with respect to the effect on United States commerce.103 For ex-
ample, recently, the Ninth Circuit upheld the convictions of a Taiwanese
company in federal court of conspiracy to fix prices of liquid crystal dis-
play panels in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.104 As one antitrust
lawyer notes, “Indeed, for many U.S. and non-U.S. entities and individu-
als, U.S. antitrust policy now governs international conduct and is the
norm.”105 The juxtaposition of the ways in which the Sherman Antitrust
Act has been interpreted by U.S. courts to apply extraterritorially despite
the often resulting problematic foreign policy issues, as described by Jus-
tice Scalia in his dissent in a seminal antitrust case,106 shows that the
ramifications of applying the law of nations to acts that occur abroad but
affect the United States may be overstated in the ATS context.
Some lower courts post-Kiobel have even concluded that to hold the
defendant accountable in some ATS cases would prove beneficial in for-
eign policy. For example, in Sexual Minorities Uganda, the Court stated:
 Indeed, the failure of the United States to make its courts avail-
able for claims against its citizens for actions taken within this
country that injure persons abroad would itself create the poten-
tial for just the sort of foreign policy complications that the limita-
tions on federal common law claims recognized under the ATS
are aimed at avoiding.107
Similarly, it is unlikely that a civil trial in U.S. federal court of a U.S.
corporation for alleged torture abroad against foreign nationals, such as
the Al Shimari case, would lead to negative foreign policy consequences. If
anything, dismissing the case rather than allowing it to proceed in court
may create more of a foreign backlash to the seeming immunity of actors
in cases of alleged abuse. In fact, both houses of Congress indicated that
the United States should not tolerate such acts when it condemned the
Abu Ghraib abuses, stating that those acts “contradict[ed] the policies, or-
ders, and laws of the United States and the United States military,”108 and
103. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (holding that if an
entity can comply with both U.S. law and foreign law, then there is no true conflict and U.S.
law can cover the extraterritorial conduct).
104. See United States v. Hui Hsiung, 758 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2015).
105. Robert D. Paul, Expanding Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Laws:
What Are the Borders? (Fall 2003), http://jp.whitecase.com/files/Publication/153c6fb0-dc49-4b
59-acde-35498e810dc6/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/f1fb36e1-c1e6-4ae4-84a8-3ad6b0
d082b3/article_practicum_autumn_2003.pdf.
106. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 820 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“That
breathtakingly broad proposition, which contradicts the many cases discussed earlier, will
bring the Sherman Act and other laws into sharp and unnecessary conflict with the legitimate
interests of other countries—particularly our closest trading partners.”).
107. 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 322–23 (D. Mass. 2013).
108. Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 521 (4th Cir. 2014) (altera-
tion in original) (quoting H.R. Res. 627, 108th Cong. (2004)).
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“urg[ing] that all individuals responsible for such despicable acts be held
accountable.”109
Proponents of a more categorical territorial approach would point to
the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Balintulo that case-specific arguments
“miss the mark” because “the canon against extraterritorial application ‘is
a presumption about a statute’s meaning’”110 and that “[i]ts ‘wisdom,’ the
Supreme Court has explained, is that, ‘[r]ather than guess anew in each
case, we apply the presumption in all cases, preserving a stable back-
ground against which Congress can legislate with predictable effects.’”111
However, this Note’s proposed three-part disjunctive test would provide
the clarity to ensure that courts do not embark on burdensome multifactor
tests to resolve if the ATS extends to the claim.
C. The ATS as a Chief Remedy for Grave Human Rights Abuses
As Sexual Minorities Uganda indicated, for certain ATS cases, it is
unlikely that there will be negative foreign policy ramifications to the U.S.
hearing the case, and the suit itself may provide beneficial foreign policy
outcomes. This is particularly true when examining the role of the ATS as
a chief statute under which victims of human rights abuses may obtain a
remedy.
There are currently no international tribunals by which corporations
can be tried for acts considered grave crimes under international law.
Thus, domestic law is often the only judicial recourse for victims of abuse
by corporate entities. As Jennifer Green, counsel for amici curiae in sup-
port of plaintiffs in Kiobel, Nestle, Giraldo, and Balintulo, has stated:
[O]ne of the biggest challenges continues to be the enforcement of
human rights standards—what penalties corporations pay when
they violate the most fundamental human rights including the
prohibitions against forced labor, torture, genocide, crimes against
humanity and war crimes, and whether the victims of these abuses
can receive any compensation. Effective accountability is critical
for an international legal system that rewards law-abiding corpo-
rations, which then contributes to the deterrence of future
violations.112
Other domestic statutes, such as the Torture Victim Protection Act
(TVPA) are narrower than the ATS, and thus are not adequate substitutes
for it. For example, the TVPA requires that an actor be operating “under
actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation” for a
109. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting S. Res. 356, 108th Cong. (2004)).
110. Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 191 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Morrison v.
Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010)).
111. Id. (alteration and emphasis supplied in Balintulo) (quoting Morrison, 561 U.S. at
261).
112. Green, supra note 10, at 1086.
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plaintiff to bring a suit.113 As the Al Shimari court noted, this requirement
precludes suit by plaintiffs against U.S. contractors because the contrac-
tors are not acting under actual or apparent authority of any foreign na-
tion. Furthermore, under the TVPA, the defendant must be a natural
person and not a corporation.114 The Supreme Court was also aware of
the limitations of these other statutes when it articulated its “touch and
concern” language in Kiobel as shown by Justice Kennedy’s concurrence
that predicted that “[o]ther cases may arise with allegations of serious vio-
lations of international law principles protecting persons” that are “cov-
ered neither by the TVPA nor by the reasoning and holding of today’s
case.”115 Justice Kennedy noted that in such cases, “the proper implemen-
tation of the presumption against extraterritorial application may require
some further elaboration and explanation.”116
Having a domestic remedy is important to incentivize actors with close
ties to a jurisdiction, especially those domiciled in the jurisdiction, to oper-
ate in accordance with the most basic humanitarian norms. A number of
cases against U.S. military contractors for alleged abuses in Iraq have sur-
vived defendants’ motions to dismiss and have settled.117 The cases against
U.S. contractors have highlighted these abuses and helped develop the
norm that just because an actor is engaging abroad does not mean that
abuse can be inflicted without recourse.118 As Green notes, this evolving
norm has contributed to added language promulgated by the Department
of Defense for private security contractors stating, “Inappropriate use of
force by contractor personnel authorized to accompany the United States
Armed Forces may subject such personnel to United States or host nation
prosecution and civil liability.”119 The ATS functions to shape behavior,
and a strict territorial rule would undermine its unique role in doing so.
113. Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73
(1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012); see generally Philip Mariani, Assessing the Proper
Relationship Between the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act, 156 U. PA.
L. REV. 1383 (2008).
114. See Doyle, supra note 13, at 478.
115. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
116. Id.
117. See Green, supra note 10, at 1091. Green points out that a series of cases that were
brought against Blackwater for beatings and shootings settled in 2010. See also In re XE Serv.
Alien Tort Litig., 665 F. Supp. 2d 569 (E.D. Va. 2009) (denying motion to dismiss), and Jaral-
lah v. Xe, No. 09-631, 2009 WL 1350958 (S.D. Cal. filed Mar. 27, 2009) (concerning a school-
teacher allegedly killed by Xe-Blackwater shooters in Iraq; this case was transferred and
consolidated with In re XE Serv.).
118. See Green, supra note 10, at 1091.
119. Id. at n.24; U.S. Dep’t. of Defense Instruction 3020.50, Change 1, Enclosure 3 at 8,
Aug. 1, 2011, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/302050p.pdf.
Spring 2016] To Touch and Concern the U.S. 559
PART III. DEFINING “TOUCH AND CONCERN” THROUGH A
THREE-PART DISJUNCTIVE TEST
In light of the above personal jurisdiction and conflict of laws analysis,
this Note proposes a three-part disjunctive test for determining when a
claim touches and concerns the territory of the United States with suffi-
cient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.
If (1) the defendant is a U.S. citizen or a U.S. corporate domiciliary; or (2)
the defendant has conducted explicit planning or extensive activity in fur-
therance of the violation in the United States; or (3) the violation was
clearly and manifestly orchestrated to target the United States, then the
claim overcomes the presumption against extraterritoriality.
This test is needed to clarify the ambiguous holding of Kiobel about
when the ATS can be applied. As the Giraldo court framed the question:
“Is mere corporate presence in . . . the United States enough? The Su-
preme Court has answered that question—clearly not. What then is
‘enough’ such that the conduct in Colombia touches and concerns the
United States with sufficient force? Kiobel has not given courts a road
map for answering this question.”120
The first part of the proposed test calls for the ATS to extend to claims
where the defendant is a U.S. national or a corporation domiciled in the
United States. This prong is rooted in Kiobel’s use of the term “claim” in
its touch and concern holding,121 as discussed in Part II.A. This prong also
seeks to advance humanitarian aims and encourage good behavior among
U.S. entities. U.S. law has an important role to play in ensuring a basic
minimum standard of treatment when its nationals operate abroad—a role
that Congress has already expressed in its passage of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act,122 TVPA,123 and Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act’s conflict minerals provision.124 For example, de-
spite the National Association of Manufacturers and United States
Chambers of Commerce pointing to the billions of dollars in lost profits to
U.S. manufacturers as a result of the Dodd-Frank provision on disclosure
120. Giraldo v. Drummond Co., No. 09-CV-1041, 2013 WL 3873960, at *5 (N.D. Ala.
July 25, 2013).
121. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
122. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (prohibiting any corporation that has securities registered
under the Securities Exchange Act or is required to file reports under the Act from paying
foreign officials to secure an improper advantage or influence any act or decision of the
government).
123. Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73
(1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
124. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act, Pub.L. 111-203,
§ 1502 (2010) (requiring the Securities Exchange Commission to promulgate regulations re-
quiring annual disclosure of any conflict minerals required for the functionality of a product
manufactured by such person originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or an
adjoining country and describing the measures taken to exercise due diligence on the source
and chain of custody of those materials); see also FACT SHEET: Disclosing the Use of Con-
flict Minerals, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/News/Arti
cle/Detail/Article/1365171562058 (last visited Aug. 1, 2016).
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of conflict minerals,125 the Securities Exchange Commission has continued
to issue regulations for disclosure to reduce the human rights implications
of procuring minerals from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In do-
ing so, it has cited humanitarian concerns.126 Similar humanitarian con-
cerns of preventing war crimes, crimes against humanity, and torture
should prompt the extraterritorial application of the ATS when the defen-
dant is a U.S. national or corporate domiciliary.
Furthermore, allowing ATS suits when the defendant is a U.S. citizen
or corporate domiciliary is in line with U.S. due process jurisprudence that
takes as a given that U.S. citizens are subject to the jurisdictional reach of
a U.S. statute, and thus does not contradict the Kiobel concerns about
haling foreigners into U.S. courts.  At the same time, this prong is respon-
sive to the Supreme Court’s language that the “presumption against extra-
territorial application” would be a “craven watchdog indeed if it retreated
to its kennel whenever some domestic activity is involved”127 because,
under this prong, the ATS would only reach defendants that are corpora-
tions domiciled in the United States (meaning those with their place of
incorporation or principal place of business in the United States)128 and
U.S. citizens. Corporations with mere presence or officers in the United
States would not qualify under this prong, as that would likely be too ex-
pansive of a read to be faithful to the Kiobel decision that the claim touch
and concern the United States “with sufficient force”129 to rebut the pre-
sumption against extraterritorial application of the ATS.
Therefore, under this prong, the ATS presumption against extraterri-
toriality would be overcome in the Balintulo suit against Daimler, Ford,
and IBM; the Al Shimari suit against CACI Premier Technology; the suit
against Nestle; and the suits against Drummond Co. because they all name
defendants incorporated in the United States. Similarly, the ATS would
reach the defendant of Sexual Minorities Uganda because of his American
citizenship. The ATS would not extend to cases involving individuals
merely passing through the United States, such as the Nigerian defendants
at issue in Kiobel.
The second prong of the proposed disjunctive test is that if the defen-
dant, including non-U.S. citizens and corporations domiciled outside the
United States, has conducted explicit planning or extensive activity in fur-
therance of the international violation while in the United States, then the
125. Karen E. Woody, Conflict Minerals Legislation: The SEC’s New Role as Diplo-
matic and Humanitarian Watchdog, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315, 1333–35 (2012).
126. See FACT SHEET: Disclosing the Use of Conflict Minerals, supra note 124 (“Con-
gress enacted Section 1502 of the Act because of concerns that the exploitation and trade of
conflict minerals by armed groups is helping to finance conflict in the DRC region and is
contributing to an emergency humanitarian crisis.”).
127. Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266 (2010).
128. This prong is also responsive to Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014),
which defined a corporate domiciliary as a corporation with its place of incorporation or
principal place of business in the United States.
129. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
Spring 2016] To Touch and Concern the U.S. 561
claim overcomes the ATS presumption. This prong is consistent with the
reasoning that animates U.S. purposeful availment doctrine: when a defen-
dant avails itself of the privileges of conducting activities with the United
States, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws, it should be
subject to a U.S. law that incentivizes conduct and protects justified expec-
tations of parties. The recent cases from the Second and Eleventh Circuits
appear to support such a prong. The Mastafa court’s use of “domestic con-
tacts” analysis where it determined that plaintiffs’ allegations of domestic
oil purchases, financing of oil purchases, and delivery of oil purchases
were enough to satisfy the “touch and concern” language demonstrates
that courts may be converging around a broader read of what conduct is
relevant for overcoming the extraterritoriality presumption.130 And the
Eleventh Circuit entertained the argument that the appropriate “relevant
conduct” inquiry of Kiobel131 may include planning activity in the United
States when it said: “Assuming, without deciding, that the ‘relevant con-
duct’ inquiry extends to the place of decision-making—as opposed to the
site of the actual ‘extrajudicial killing’—the allegations . . . still fall short of
the minimum factual predicate warranting the extraterritorial application
of the ATS.”132
The third prong of this Note’s proposed test is if the international vio-
lation was clearly and manifestly directed at the United States, with the
intent of harming the United States and its citizens, then foreign plaintiffs
injured should be able to bring the case under the ATS. This prong adopts
the reasoning of the District Court for the District of Columbia in Mwani
when it rejected defendants’ motion to dismiss and stated that Kiobel had
left open a narrow avenue for jurisdiction over acts that occurred outside
the United States.133
This three-part disjunctive test differs from other recent suggestions
on how to define “touch and concern.” For example, one scholar has pro-
posed a six-part balancing test, which would include the location of the
alleged violation, the location of other alleged relevant conduct, the na-
tionality of the defendant, the demands of international comity, the likeli-
hood that denial of the ATS could result in the United States harboring a
human rights violator, and any other American national interest that sup-
ports recognition of ATS jurisdiction.134 A multi-pronged balancing ap-
proach to determining what actions touch and concern the United States
would perhaps lead to incongruent results depending on how much weight
a given court places on each of the proposed factors.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has explicitly shown its preference
for clearer lines, as opposed to multi-pronged balancing tests, when it
comes to deciding the extraterritorial application of American statutes. In
130. Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 188, 195 (2d Cir. 2014).
131. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
132. Baloco v. Drummond Co., Inc., 767 F.3d 1229, 1236 (11th Cir. 2014).
133. Mwani v. Bin Laden and Al Qaeda, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2013).
134. Doyle, supra note 13, at 467–68.
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the antitrust arena, for example, the Supreme Court in Hartford Fire Ins.
Co. v. California rejected the Ninth Circuit’s longstanding multi-pronged
balancing test to determine application of the Sherman Antitrust Statute
to actions abroad.135 The three-part disjunctive test that this Note pro-
poses is predictable and clear, while also being fair to victims of grave
human rights abuses.
CONCLUSION
With the increasing interchange of people and corporations across
borders, U.S. jurisprudence on the ATS requires delineating a clear, but
just, test under which victims of specific, universal, and obligatory interna-
tional violations may obtain a remedy in the post-Kiobel era. This Note
has put forward a three-part disjunctive test that would allow the ATS to
extend to claims where (1) the defendant is a U.S. citizen or U.S.-domi-
ciled corporation; or (2) the defendant has conducted explicit planning or
extensive activity in furtherance of the international violation in the
United States; or (3) the violation was clearly and manifestly targeted at
the United States, with the intent of harming the United States and its
citizens.
While the days of United States corporate involvement in the crimes
of apartheid in South Africa are over, the potential for abuse abroad in
other contexts is not. For example, in the wake of the 2014 Africa Summit
hosted by the United States in Washington, D.C., U.S. companies pledged
fourteen billion dollars of investment and commercial trade in Africa.136
The increased exposure of U.S. corporations abroad requires a sufficient
framework for ensuring compliance with basic human rights norms. Vic-
tims of crimes that are orchestrated in the United States or that target the
United States should also have redress. In the post-Kiobel era, the ATS
still has a unique role to play in providing one of the only forms of re-
course for grave human rights violations that occur outside territorial
borders.
135. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 815 (1993) (rejecting a multi-
pronged test articulated in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d
597, 614 (9th Cir. 1976)).
136. Margaret Talev, Obama Wins $14 Billion in Pledges for Africa Investments,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Aug. 5, 2014, 7:53 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2014-08-05/obama-wins-14-billion-in-pledges-for-africa-investments.
